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INDIRECT GOVERNMENTAL
PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE:
A NEW FACET OF SUPERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY
Interference in the performance of a contractual duty resulting
from a judicial, executive or administrative order must be contem-
plated by every contractual draftsman. City of Valdez v. Valdez
Development Co.' examined a federal injunction's effect on timely
perfonnance of an agreement and its subsequent impact on the doc-
trine of impossibility. The City of Valdez brought suit to regain title
to a proposed urban renewal site on the ground that the developer,
who presently held title, had failed to meet contractual construction
deadlines.: The developer argued that an intervening federal injunc-
tion, which prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from issuing a
permit for construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline,3 prevented him
from obtaining essential financing.4 The injunction, it was argued,
was an unexpected event, temporarily excusing performance.5 The
City contended that it had contracted for the building of new housing
and that the injunction issued against the pipeline was totally unre-
lated to the performance of the contract.6 The trial court held that
the federal injunction barring construction of the pipeline7 made the
acquisition of financing and initiation of new construction in Valdez
virtually impossible.8 The decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Alaska. 9
1. 523 P.2d 177 (Alas. 1974).
2. Id. at 179.
3. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
4. Brief for Appellee at 12, City of Valdez v. Valdez Dev. Co., 523 P.2d 177
(Alas. 1974).
5. The contract expressly provided:[IJn the event of enforced delay in the performance of such obligations due to
unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence,
including, but not restricted to, act of God, acts of the public enemy, acts of
the Federal Government . . . ; it being the purpose and intent of this pro-
vision that in the event of the occurrence of any such enforced delay, the time
or times for performance . .. shall be extended for the period of the enforced
delay . ...
523 P.2d at 180.
6. Id. at 180-81.
7. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
8. 523 P.2d at 181.
9. id. at 185.
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At early common law contractual provisions were strictly con-
strued.' o Courts were unwilling to excuse performance in the event
of an unexpected occurrence," and as a result the doctrine of im-
possibility retained a very narrow interpretation. The evolution of
the contract as an expression of social and economic relationships and
the gradual recognition of the need for a more active judicial role
in society,12 however, necessitated a more equitable allocation of busi-
ness risks.'3
From a foundation of equitable allocation of business risks, the
doctrine of impossibility was broadened to include impracticability
of performance caused by extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense
or loss.' 4 Impracticability's rather than strict impossibility was deemed
sufficient to qualify for excused performance under the doctrine.10
The doctrine of impossibility requires a determination that an unex-
pected occurrence has drastically transformed the performance initially
bargained for into a totally different object.'7 This determination
10. See Atkinson v. Ritchie, 103 Eng. Rep. 877, 878 (K.B. 1809); Company
of Proprietors of the Brecknock & Abergavenny Canal Navigation v. Pritchard,
101 Eng. Rep. 807, 807-08 (K.B. 1796); Smith, Some Practical Aspects of the
Doctrine of Impossibility, 32 ILL. L. REv. 672, 672-73 (1938).
11. See, e.g., Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). The court held:
"[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself,
he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevit-
able necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract." Id.
Accord, Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1948).
12. See Smith, supra note 10, at 673.
13. See Nickoll & Knight v. Ashton, Eldridge & Co., [1901] 2 K.B. 126, 135;
Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314-15 (Q.B. 1863); cf., e.g., Tecon
Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1271, 1281-82 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See generally
Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18
MiCE. L. Rnv. 589 (1920); The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law:
Some Selected Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 880 (1957).
14. See, e.g., H.B. Zachry Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 391 F.2d 43 (5th
Cir. 1968); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEmENT]. See also Merl F. Thomas Sons, Inc. v. State, 396 P.2d 76, 79
(Alas. 1964), citing 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1963 (rev. ed. 1938).
15. See, e.g., Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 456 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, 81 (Alas. 1974).
16. See, e.g., Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Constr. Co., 60 F. Supp. 555,
559 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); Tombigbee Constructors v. United States, 420 F.2d 1037,
1049 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 456 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
17. See Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1921);
Parrish v. Stratton Cripple Creek Mining & Dev. Co., 116 F.2d 207, 209-10
(10th Cir. 1940).
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should represent an "ever-shifting line,"18 drawn in accordance with
current commercial practices and mores, at which the commercial
senselessness of requiring performance outweighs the community's
interest in strictly construing the contractual terms.19
The modem definition of impossibility is a practical rather than a
technically exact meaning.20 Mere unanticipated hardship not amount-
ing to impracticability, however, does not fall within the scope of
the modem definition.;' Courts have continuously held that when
the unanticipated difficulty involves inadequate finances, neither
bankruptcy, insolvency, undercapitalization,- nor a rise or collapse
of a market 3 will alone justify a holding of commercial impractica-
bility.24 The law traditionally will not excuse performance merely
because fulfillment of a contractual duty is not possible under the
most economical means.235
18. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Transatlantic had a government charter to deliver wheat to Iran. No
route was specified. Following nationalization of the Suez Canal, the contract
was consummated. Egypt subsequently closed the canal. The court refused to
grant Transatlantic relief despite the additional cost of using an unanticipated
and more expensive route.
19. Id. See also American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd.,
453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 454, comment a.
21. Id.
22. Consolidated Airborne Sys., Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 941, 946 (Ct.
Cl. 1965).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4 [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.]; accord, Ingham Lumber Co. v. Ingersoll, 93 Ark. 447, 452, 125 S.W.
139, 142 (1910) (financial panic of 1907); McCreery v. Green, 38 Mich. 172,
179-80 (1878) (financial panic of 1873); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School
Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1085-86, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-90 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(23% increase in milk prices); Levy Plumbing Co. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co., 68 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (Great Depression).
24. See, e.g., Lewis v. Harcliff Coal Co., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 6, 8 (W.D. Pa.
1965).
25. Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 457 (Ct. CI. 1967). The
modern approach was illustrated in a recent case in which the court rejected the
impossibility defense when a town was unable to obtain adequate financing neces-
sary for an urban renewal project. Dworman v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 370
F. Supp. 1056, 1070 (D.N.J. 1974). The project plan first called for the con-
struction of an underground parking garage by the town followed by the con-
struction of an office building above it by a developer. The building was to be
leased to the developer upon completion of the garage by the town. The town
contracted with a developer while expecting to receive federal assistance to sup-
plement local bond financing. Serious problems arose when the town was unable
to agree on a mode of financing and the federal money was not forthcoming.
Id. at 1061-63. The town found it was not able to comply with the contractual
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The Valdez court developed a two-pronged approach for dealing
with the financing problem by first specifically categorizing the de-
veloper's finances and then evaluating the impact of the federal
injunction on performance of the contract. The developer's finances
were put in the category of necessities, such as labor and materials.26
The court's view was that if a severe shortage of raw materials or
a shutdown of all the major sources of supply were to cause a marked
increase in cost or prevent acquisition of necessary supplies alto-
gether, performance would be excused.2 7
The court in Valdez recognized that the inability to obtain ade-
quate financing was not merely an additional difficulty. It found
that financing was impossible to obtain,28 and that inability to obtain
provision requiring timely performance. Id. at 1062. The court held that a
party who contracts to provide certain goods or services which initially require
obtaining the financial assistance of third persons is not excused by the fact that
the financing parties will not cooperate. Id. at 1070; see 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1340 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
26. 523 P.2d at 182.
27. See id.; U.C.C., supra note 23, § 2-615, Comment 4. See also Gilbride,
The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN
L. R v. 177, 197-200 (1964). A recent case in which the funding of an urban
renewal project was at issue held that the unavailability of certain funding, al-
though presenting the promisor with additional difficulties and inconveniences,
did not excuse performance. Ogdensburg Urban Renewal Agency v. Moroney,
42 App. Div. 2d 639, 640, 345 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (1973).
28. 523 P.2d at 181 n.4. See note 32 infra. The dissent disregarded the trial
court's finding of fact and argued that although performance may have been more
difficult or expensive than the parties anticipated, performance should not be
excused. 523 P.2d at 185 (Connor, J., dissenting). In Glidden Co. v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960), which the dissent viewed as directly
in point, the ship owner signed a contract to deliver ore by ship from India to
a designated port in the United States. The contract listed three possible routes.
Attached to the statement of the listed routes was a typed-in phrase stating that
the American port should be designated "on the vessel's passing Gibralter."
Shortly after signing the contract Egypt closed the Suez Canal. The ship owner
refused to perform and claimed it was excused by either a force majeure clause
or by the typed-in phrase which allegedly had been specifically inserted to desig-
nate Suez as the only route. The court ruled against the ship owner and held
that he had been left with specific contractual alternatives to the Suez route.
Id. at 255. Although it admitted that the contract could be viewed in favor of
either party, the court found it difficult to imply that the typed-in phrase was
intended to abrogate other specific references to alternative routes appearing in
the same sentence. The court felt it was very doubtful that experienced busi-
nessmen, intent upon altering the terms of a printed contract, would act in such
an ambiguous and indirect fashion. Id. at 256. In addition, uncontroverted
testimony was introduced at trial that Hellenic, before concluding negotiations
on the first charter order, had unsuccessfully urged Glidden to accept a clause
[Vol. 10:395
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financing could not be attributed to a particular individual.29 The
unavailability of financial assistance to any developer in the area was
not the result of a lack of competence 0 or diligence,31 but rather
grew out of the federal injunction.- Neither the developer nor the
City were named parties in the suit to enjoin the pipeline,33 and
neither had any control over the outcome. This lack of any connec-
tion with the federal injunction viewed in the light of the specific
contractual provision pertaining to circumstances beyond the control
of either party 4 led the court to assume that neither party had in-
tended to bind itself absolutely. 5
specifically excusing performance by the ship owner in the event the canal was
closed. Id.
Valdez clearly can be distinguished from Glidden. No evidence of negotiations
or proposals for including the pipeline construction permit as a condition prece-
dent was presented in Valdez. No alternative financing plans were specifically
enumerated in the contract, and the trial court found that there were none avail-
able. That finding of fact was not contested by the City on appeal. The dissent
also argued that the early negotiations should have been viewed in the light of
the vagaries of federal government action with regard to the pipeline. The dissent
felt the parties could have adjusted their agreement, if indeed they desired to
allow suspension of the project provided the pipeline permit was not granted.
29. 523 P.2d at 182; see note 32 infra. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14,
§ 455. The difference between objective and subjective impossibility is basically
the difference between a party saying, "The thing cannot be done," and saying,
"I cannot do it." Id. comment a; accord, United States v. Wegematic Corp.,
360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966); CORBIN, supra note 25, §§ 1325, 1332.
30. Cf. H.B. Zachry Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 391 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir.
1968).
31. Cf. Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Constr. Co., 60 F. Supp. 555, 559
(E.D.N.Y. 1945). The Vernon court rejected the allegation that an attempt to
acquire the necessary material "from its usual and regular channels as well as
elsewhere" was sufficient to satisfy a reasonable definition of impossibility.
32. 523 P.2d at 182. Testimony in the trial court by a representative of the
Alaska State Housing Authority demonstrated that after issuance of the federal
injunction, it became impossible for any developer to obtain financing for con-
struction of housing in Valdez.
33. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
34. See note 5 supra.
35. Cf. 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1953 (rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON]. The court never faced the City's argument that it had contracted
for housing regardless of whether or not the pipeline was built. See note 6 and
accompanying text supra. Perhaps the court felt a mere glance at official popu-
lation figures of Valdez prior to its being considered as the prime location for
the terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was sufficient to counter that argument.
Official figures show:
Place 1940 1950 1960 1970
Anchorage 4,229 11,254 44,237 48,029
Fairbanks 3,455 5,771 13,311 14,771
Juneau 5,729 5,956 6,797 6,050
Valdez 529 554 555 1,005
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The second prong involved the federal injunction and subsequent
governmental interference. The modem view holds that disruption
of contractual performance by judicial order or decreen may qualify
as a valid defense in an action for non-performance3 7 providing the
disruption was not caused by the defendant's own negligence sa and
no means of avoiding such interference were reasonably available3"
DivisioN OF ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE, ALASKA DEP'T OF ECONOsIC DEV., ALASKA
STATISTICAL REviEw 13, 45 (1972). Without the pipeline, Valdez would have
little use for expansive new housing. Brief for Appellee at 10-11, City of Valdez
v. Valdez Dev. Co., 523 P.2d 177 (Alas. 1974).
A similar approach was used by the court in disposing of the City's allegation
that the developer be barred from relying on the contract to excuse performance
because of the failure to give the required notice. The trial court found that
because of the injunction prohibiting pipeline construction and its effects on local
construction financing, no construction by any developer took place on other lands
owned by the City while the injunction was in effect. The Valdez court held
that specific written notice was not necessary, since the economic impact of the
pipeline injunction on the City of Valdez was readily apparent to all. 523 P.2d
at 182.
36. 523 P.2d at 181 n.6, citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 458b
(1933). See, e.g., Kuhl v. School Dist., 155 Neb. 357, 51 N.W.2d 746 (1952);
Olyphant Borough School Dist. v. American Sur. Co., 322 Pa. 22, 184 A. 758
(1936).
37. U.C.C., supra note 23, § 2-615(a) & Comment 10; WILLISTON, supra
note 35, § 1939.
38. See generally Thornton v. Arlington Independent School Dist., 332 S.W.2d
395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
39. See, e.g., Austin Square, Inc. v. City Prods. Corp., 24 Ohio App. 2d 158,
160, 53 Ohio Op. 2d 366, 367, 265 N.E.2d 322, 323 (1970). Austin Square
leased a storeroom in a proposed shopping center to plaintiff. An injunction
halted construction because the proposed project was not a neighborhood shop-
ping center as defined by the city zoning code. Austin Square then submitted a
revised building plan, but it too was turned down. Plaintiff sued for nonper-
formance. In finding for Austin Square the court held that construction of the
shopping center was rendered legally impossible by the injunction. Even though
Austin Square had been unsuccessful in its efforts to comply with the court order,
the court held it had done everything legally required and was excused from
performance. Cf. U.C.C., supra note 23, § 2-615, Comment 10; CORBIN, supra
note 25, § 1346.
Another strong articulation of the modern view is presented in Kuhl v. School
Dist., 155 Neb. 357, 51 N.W.2d 746 (1952). Plaintiffs in Kuhl bro'ught an action
to recover upon their respective teaching contracts. The contracts allegedly
were breached by defendant school district's refusal to open or conduct school.
The school district claimed that an injunction prevented the opening of the
school during the period covered by the alleged contracts, and by operation of
law, performance was excused. Id. at 358, 51 N.W.2d at 747. The court held
that when judicial process interrupts an agreement and renders performance
impossible, performance will be excused. Id. at 367, 51 N.W.2d at 752.
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The dual approach in Valdez resulted in exposing the interdepend-
ence of the financing problem and the federal injunction and thereby
forced the court to consider a previously unlitigated question. Valdez
does not fit a conventional mold. Impossibility of performance by
the developer was not caused by either financing problems or the
injunction alone40 but instead was a function of both.
As interpreted by the Valdez court, the acts of the federal govern-
ment referred to in the contractual provision relating to enforced
delay included injunctions.41 The court acknowledged, however, that
cases excusing timely performance on that ground involved situations
in which the direct cause of the delay was the injunction itself.42
The federal injunction did not directly prohibit the developer from
constructing housing in Valdez. The developer, nevertheless, argued
that the influence of the injunction on the entire course of events,
and particularly its effect on the financing of new housing construc-
tion, was by no means inconsequential. 43 The effect of the injunction
40. The Valdez court admitted that the injunction by itself would not excuse
timely performance. 523 P.2d at 181. See also Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School
Dist,, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1083, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
41. 523 P.2d at 181 & n.6; see note 5 supra.
42. 523 P.2d at 181; see, e.g., Savannah Printing Specialties & Paper Prods.
Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632, 636 (S.D. Ga. 1972). The
Union Camp court held that a contractual obligation to perform is excused when
intervening government regulations render performance impossible. In Acme
Moving & Storage Corp. v. Bower, 269 Md. 478, 481-84, 306 A.2d 545, 547-48
(1973), plaintiff signed a lease for a warehouse defendant was building. De-
fendant soon encountered zoning difficulties. The difficulties were resolved when
the District Council granted a special exception to use the property for ware-
houses totally enclosed by chain link fencing. Permission was conditioned on
local Planning Board approval of defendant's landscaping plan. The Planning
Board disapproved the proposed landscaping and ordered defendant to remove
the chain link fence. Defendant was unable to meet the inconsistent special
zoning requirements and the landscaping plan. The court held a contractual duty
was discharged when performance was prevented or prohibited by a judicial,
executive or administrative order, in the absence of circumstances showing either
a contrary intention or contributing fault on the part of the promisor. See also
Boer v. Garcia, 240 N.Y. 9, 10, 147 N.E. 231, 232 (1925); Nitro Powder Co. v.
Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 233 N.Y. 294, 297-98, 135 N.E. 507,
508 (1922); Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, Inc., 231 N.Y. 290, 300,
132 N.E. 93, 96 (1921).
43. Brief for Appellee, supra note 35, at 11-12. See generally ALASKA STATIS-
TICAL Ryvmw, supra note 35, at 10, 49. The loss of an opportunity to tap,
effectively distribute, and tax oil reserves estimated at between 10 and 20 billion
barrels would substantially affect any state. Alaska with a population barely over
300,000 was no exception. See also 523 P.2d at 182.
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was the same as if it had been issued directly against the construction
of housing. The court held that the federal injunction was the
actual and proximate cause of the inability to obtain financing for
housing construction in Valdez and found it was effectively impossible
for the developer to perform.4 4
The holding cautiously moved beyond any previous judicial bound-
ary. The court retained the criteria requiring the party who claims
impossibility to carry the burden of proving that cdaim. 4r For the
first time, however, the court found that the decisive factor was the
interrelation of the inability to obtain adequate financing with sub-
stantial evidence of indirect governmental prevention of performance.
This is not to say that the Valdez court gave any advantage to the
party claiming impossibility. Although not required to show direct
judicial intervention, if the developer had not met the burden of
proving impossibility or commercial impracticability of performance,
the City would have undoubtedly succeeded in its attempt to regain
title to the land. When the burden was met, the Valdez court de-
cided against discharging the parties from performance. Instead it
extended the deadlines under the specific contractual provision for
an enforced delay.46
The developer asserted the specific contractual provision throughout
his entire defense.47 The question arises, however, whether the con-
tract was as impregnable as the developer claimed. The Valdez prob-
lem could have been avoided by anticipating the possibility of a
financing problem and inserting a subjective financing clause into the
44. 523 P.2d at 182. For a discussion of the elements of the actual and
proximate cause test see text at notes 27-35 supra. The court felt that without
the federal injunction there would have been no financing problem and without
the financing problem there would have been no impossibility of performance.
45. See 523 P.2d at 181 n.4; Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App.
2d 71, 83, 268 P.2d 12, 21 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); CoRBIN, supra note 25, § 1329.
46. 523 P.2d at 180 n. 3. Cf., e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Bodek, 108 N.J. Eq.
584, 590-91, 155 A. 799, 802 (Oh. 1931), in which the State Board of Health
secured an injunction against a municipality restraining it from tapping the munic-
ipal sewage system until the borough erected a suitable sewage disposal plant. The
Bodek court, like the Valdez court, held that performance of the contract was
only suspended, not excused, by the injunction. See also F.A. Tamplin Steamship
Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Prods. Co. [1916] 2 A.C. 397; CORnI, supra
note 25, § 1348; WILLISTON, supra note 35, § 1957; RESTATEMIENT, supra note
14, § 462; Page, supra note 13, at 611.
47. 523 P.2d at 180; see note 5 supra.
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contract.- s Surely, any developer planning a project calling for the
expenditure of $1,200,0004 9 will need financial assistance5o
By failing to hold the developer responsible for anticipating prob-
lems in raising over a million dollars, the Valdez court ventured onto
new ground. Prior to Valdez, a governmental act indirectly yet ad-
versely affecting the performance of a contract was not given much
weight.51 The injunction against the pipeline, although admittedly
affecting performance indirectly,52 proved to be decisive in Valdez.
Whether this expansion53 of governmental prevention of performance
48. A subjective financing clause could consist of a provision allowing the
developer to be excused from performance in the absence of circumstances show-
ing contributing fault on his part, if financing became either impracticable or
impossible. See generally Locke v. Bort, 10 Wis. 2d 585, 103 N.W.2d 555 (1960).
See also Smith, supra note 10, at 677-80.
49. 523 P.2d at 181 n.4.
50. While the developer could argue that it was unreasonable to believe at
the time of agreement that anything would possibly occur to prevent him from
obtaining adequate financing, it is a rather naive approach given the prospective
site of performance. The City of Valdez was almost totally destroyed by tidal
waves resulting from the earthquake of 1964. Considering that fact, one could
construct a hypothetical situation in which an earthquake and tidal wave, instead
of a federal injunction, could have handicapped the developer's obtaining
financing in 1970. It could reasonably have been suspected that given a hypo-
thetical earthquake in 1970 and Valdez' susceptibility to tidal waves, the reoc-
currence of such severe damage may have forced the oil companies to reconsider
locating the terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Valdez in favor of a more
protected site. Arguably the hypothetical 1970 earthquake would cause Valdez
to be presented again. The developer in the hypothetical could argue that the
earthquake and tidal waves had indirectly yet substantially adversely affected his
ability to perform. He could also argue that the "act of God" term of the con-
tract protected his inability to acquire financing. The City's argument would be
much stronger in the hypothetical, for it had only been six years since the 1964
earthquake. The court in the hypothetical Valdez would have trouble finding the
hypothetical 1970 quake unforeseeable. Cf. United States v. Buffalo Coal Mining
Co., 345 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1965).
To attain the same result as Valdez, the court in the hypothetical might be
forced to go even further in its expansion. It would have to hold for the first
time that in cases of prevention of performance due to indirect acts of God, per-
formance would be excused. Such a holding, however, could have two alter-
natively undesirable results. It might have the effect of giving a judicial nod of
approval to open-ended, ambiguous contracts. Secondly, such a holding may
force the court to put even greater emphasis on what the subjective spirit of the
contract was when signed.
51. See Dworman v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 370 F. Supp. 1056, 1071
(D.N.J. 1974); Ogdensburg Urban Renewal Agency v. Moroney, 42 App. Div.
639, 640, 345 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170-71 (1973).
52. 523 P.2d at 181.
53. The contractual language that enabled the court to develop its actual and
proximate cause theory was the "including, but not restricted to" general phrase.
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will enable the courts to render more equitable decisions or will
result in severely overstraining an already tired legal term" has yet
to be determined. The answer may lie in how courts view their
function in society.55
A contract is the embodiment of an economic relationship. When
the court examines such a relationship, it must look to the economic
realities of the situation. In Valdez the court enabled the developer
to save an opportunity to make a profit out of a situation he had not
caused. On the other hand the court did not intend to cast the City
of Valdez and other future sponsors of urban renewal projects adrift,
completely at the mercy of unpredictable political tides. Nor was it
the court's design to allow urban renewal to stagnate in inactivity
as the result of inconsequential indirect governmental interference.
After Valdez any party alleging impossibility growing out of indirect
governmental prevention of performance will have to meet the actual
and proximate cause test.56 Thus it can be said that this is not an
example of freewheeling judicial expansion. Instead, Valdez can
serve as a model for a reasonable approach, avoiding a strict hyper-
technical result, for dealing with a supervening situation beyond the
control of either party to a contract.
James M. Thomas
See note 5 supra; cf. Womacklv. United States, 389 F.2d 783, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 518, 519-20 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
54. "With a definition as broad as this some of the later stated rules of dis-
charge by 'impossibility' may be 'impossible' of easy application." CORDIN,
supra note 25, at 338 n.29. See generally Anderson, Frustration of Contract
'-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DF PAUL L. REv. 1 (1953); Patterson, The Appor-
tionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. Rnv. 335,
348, 352 (1924); Note, The Fetish of Impossibility in the Law of Contracts, 53
COLUM. L. RaV. 94 (1953). See also A. BECHT & F. MILLER, FACTUAL CAUSA-
TION (1961).
55. See also CORBIN, supra note 25, § 1329; Comment, Apportioning Loss
after Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J.
1054 (1960).
56. See text at notes 27-35, 44 supra.
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